Pamela Hieronymi

Pamela Hieronymi
Institutions	University of California, Los Angeles, Harvard University
Main interests	Moral psychology, Moral responsibility, agency

Pamela Hieronymi is a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles.^[1] Her primary research area is moral psychology, with a special emphasis on issues of responsibility and agency.^[2] Her work on these topics, as well as her work on reasons, trust, forgiveness, and the voluntariness of belief, has been influential and widely cited.^[3][4][5] In 2010 she won the Frederick Burkhardt Residential Fellowship for Recently Tenured Scholars from the American Council of Learned Societies.^[6] She spent the 2011–2012 academic year as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University.^[7]

Hieronymi earned her A.B. from Princeton University in 1992^[8] and earned her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2000.^[9] She has worked at UCLA since July 2000, where she was awarded tenure in 2007.^[8] She has presented her research widely, both nationally and internationally.^[8] In addition, she has appeared on Philosophy Talk public radio and her thoughts on technology and teaching were published by the Chronicle of Higher Education.^[10]

Awards and fellowships

• Frederick Burkhardt Residential Fellowship for Recently Tenured Scholars, ACLS, September 2011–June 2012
• Fellowship, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, September 2011–June 2012
• Assistant Professor Career Development Grant, UCLA, March–June 2006
• Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship for Junior Faculty, American Council of Learned Societies, July 2003–May 2004
• Summer Stipend, National Endowment for the Humanities, May–June 2003
• Carrier Prize, Harvard University Department of Philosophy, July 2001
• Charlotte W. Newcombe Dissertation Fellowship, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, June 1999–June 2000

Selected works

• “Don’t Confuse Technology with Teaching,” Chronicle of Higher Education 63, no. 44 (August 13, 2012): A19
• “Reasons for Action,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2011): 407–27.
• “Believing at Will,” Belief and Agency, David Hunter, ed., The Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 35 (2009): 149–187.
• “Of Metaphysics and Motivation: The Appeal of Contractualism,” Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011): 101–128.
• “Two Kinds of Agency,” Mental Actions, Lucy O’Brien and Matthew Soteriou, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2009): 138–62.
• “The Reasons of Trust,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 2 (June 2008): 213–36.
• “Controlling Attitudes,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87, no. 1 (March 2006): 45–74.
• “The Wrong Kind of Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy 102, no. 9 (September 2005): 437–57.
• “The Force and Fairness of Blame,” Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 115–48.
• “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, no. 3 (May 2001): 529–55.

References